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Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal
INTRODUCTION
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention)' was
adopted in 19892 and entered into force on May 5, 1992.3 Despite the
Basel Convention's intention to reduce the overall number of trans-
boundary shipments of hazardous wastes, no system was created to es-
tablish liability should an accident occur.4 In December 1999, at the Fifth
Conference of the Parties to the Convention, a liability protocol was fi-
nalized,5 and the Basel Convention came closer to protecting member na-
1. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, S. TREATY Doc. No. 5 (1991), 28 I.L.M. 657
[hereinafter Basel Convention]. For an in-depth background on the Basel Conven-
tion, see Miles L. Buckingham, The Basel Convention, COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 1998 Y.B. 291 (1999).
2. See Basic Description of the Basel Convention (visited Feb. 16, 2000)
<http://www.basel.intlabout.htrnl>.
3. See id.
4. See Buckingham, supra note 1,
5. BAN Report and Analysis of the Fifth Conference of the Parties to the Basel Conven-
tion (visited Jan. 24, 2000) <http://www.ban.org/COP5/cop5rep.html> [hereinafter
BAN Report]. The Liability Protocol first opened for signature on March 6 to 17 at
Switzerland's Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The Protocol will again open
for signature from April 1 to December 10, 2000 at the United Nations Headquar-
ters in New York. The Protocol will enter into force after it has been ratified by
twenty nations. See UNEP, Liability Regime for Hazardous Wastes Accidents
Opens for Signature in Bern (press release Mar. 6, 2000)
<http://www.unep.org/unep/per/ipa/pressrel/r03-0600.001>.
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tions from accidents due to the transboundary shipments of hazardous
wastes.
I. HISTORY OF PROTOCOL
The Basel Convention mandates that "[t]he Parties shall co-operate
with a view to adopting, as soon as practicable, a protocol setting out ap-
propriate rules and procedures in the field of liability and compensation
for damage resulting from transboundary movement and disposal of haz-
,,6ardous wastes and other wastes. Despite this mandate, work on the Pro-
tocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
7
(Liability Protocol or Protocol) unearthed significant problems over the
last seven years. The discussions initially began in 1993, when the first
draft protocol was issued by the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and
Technical Experts.8 At the Second Conference of the Parties in March
1994,9 the Parties voted to advance the Protocol in hopes that it would be
finalized by the Third Conference in September 1995. However, this
did not occur.
Even in the final months before the Fifth Conference, the Liability
Protocol faced significant opposition. The largest conflicts concerned the
potential establishment of an international "Superfund" to pay for future
accidents,"' and the possibility that exporters would have to pay for acci-
dents that occur after the hazardous material had arrived at the disposal
site.12 US exporters were particularly concerned about the second issue.
13
They succeeded in having the draft protocol changed to limit their liabil-
6. Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 12.
7. Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (visited Mar. 17, 2000)
<http://www.unep.ch/basel/COP5/docs/prot-e.pdf >[hereinafter Liability Protocol].
8. See Basel Liability Protocol Drafted, ENvTL. LIABILrrY REP., Oct. 29, 1993, at 11,
available in 1993 WL 10912079.
9. See id.
10. See Basel Plenary Approves Protocol Work, ENVTL. LIABIuTY REP., Apr. 25, 1994,
at 6, available in 1994 WL 10096886.
11. See Countries Push for Superfund-Like System at Latest Basel Meeting, SOLID
WASTE REP., Feb. 4, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10390719.
12. See Jack Lucentini, Exporters Won't Be Hit with Cleanup Costs Under Revised Li-
ability Proposal, J. COM., Mar. 26, 1999, at A3, available in 1999 WL 6374608.
13. According to one estimate, the "proposed agreement [could] affect an estimated $14
billion to $18 billion in materials exported by U.S. producers." Id.
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ity to accidents occurring only while the material is in transit.' 4 In Sep-
tember, developed countries, including Germany, Australia, and Canada,
finally rejected attempts to establish a compensation fund. '
5
II. THE LIABILITY PROTOCOL
The objective of the Protocol is to provide for a comprehensive re-
gime for liability and for adequate and prompt compensation for
damage resulting from the transboundary movement of hazardous




The Protocol's guidelines for liability are quite simple, and Article 3
outlines the situations in which the Protocol's provisions will apply.'7
Generally, when the importing state and exporting state are both Con-
tracting Parties,' 8 the Protocol will apply until the completion of dis-
posal.19 In this case, the notifier20 will be strictly liable until the disposer
takes possession of the wastes, at which time the disposer would be li-
able for any damage.2' Where only one party is a Contracting Party, the
Protocol will only apply to damage that occurs while the hazardous
22wastes are in the possession of the Contracting Party. If a waste is not
specifically included in the Basel Convention, but is considered hazard-
ous by the domestic legislation of a Party, the Protocol will only apply
when the wastes have been notified in accordance with Article 3 of the
Basel Convention.23
14. See id.
15. See Esther Tan, Payment for Waste Disposal: Talks Fail, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Sept.
20, 1999, at 15, available in 1999 WL 21743614.
16. Liability Protocol, supra note 7, art. 1.
17. See id, art. 3.
18. "Contracting Party" is defined in Article 2, paragraph 2(f) of the Liability Protocol as
"a Party to the Protocol." Id. art. 2, 2(f).
19. See id. art. 3, 2.
20. The "notifier" can be either the importing or the exporting state. See Liability Proto-
col, supra note 7, art. 3, 2. Moreover, the "notifier" may also be the actual "gen-
erator or exporter" of the materials. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 6, 1.
21. See Liability Protocol, supra note 7, art. 4, 1.
22. See id. art. 3, 3(b).
23. See id. art. 3, 6(b). Either the State of Import or Export, or both, may notify a
waste. See id.
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In addition to the strict liability regime outlined in Article 4, the Li-
ability Protocol assigns liability to any person "for damage caused or
contributed to by his lack of compliance with the provisions implement-
ing the Convention or by his wrongful intentional, reckless or negligent
acts or omissions. 24
However, even when both parties are Contracting Parties, Article 3,
Paragraph 6 provides that the Protocol may not apply where both parties
are part of a liability agreement entered into prior to the Protocol's entry
into force.25 This provision primarily impacts developed countries that
are parties to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD).26 The Protocol also excuses from liability any accidents if
the Party responsible for the waste can show that the accident was:
(a) The result of an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or in-
surrection;
(b) The result of a natural phenomenon of exceptional, inevitable,
unforeseeable and irresistible character;
(c) Wholly the result of compliance with a compulsory measure of a
public authority of the State where the damage occurred; or
(d) Wholly the result of the wrongful intentional conduct of a third
party, including the person who suffered the damage.
27
B. Payments
The Protocol requires that any person liable under Article 4 "main-
tain during the period of the time limit of liability, insurance, bonds or
other financial guarantees covering their liability., 28 These guarantees
must satisfy the minimum limits established in Annex B to the Proto-
col.29 Contracting Parties may bring a claim for damages in the court of a
Contracting Party where: "(a) The damage was suffered; or (b) The inci-
dent occurred; or (c) The defendant has his habitual residence, or has his
principal place of business., 30 Any person liable under the Protocol shall
be allowed to seek contribution from any other person liable under the
24. Id. art. 5.
25. See Liability Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3, 6(a).
26. See Daniel Pruzin, Hazardous Waste: Agreement on Liability Protocol Reached at
Basel Conference of Parties, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Dec. 13, 1999, at AA-1.
27. Liability Protocol, supra note 7, art. 4, 5.
28. Id. art. 14, 1. Article 13 establishes the time limit for liability. See id. art. 13.
29. See id. art. 14, 1. Note that there is no limit for Article 5 fault-based liability.
30. Id. art. 17, 11.
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Protocol, 1 or from any 3?erson with whom the liable party has an express
contractual agreement. Liability may also be reduced or disallowed if
the injured party caused or contributed to the damage.33
III. CRITICISMS
Only time will tell us whether the protocol will remain as weak and
dangerous as it is currently drafted or whether it will in time be
amended to assure real victim protection and provide incentives for
industry to reduce transboundary movements and the generation of
hazardous wastes.
34
Initial reactions to the Liability Protocol varied. Klaus Topfer, Ex-
ecutive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, called
the adoption of the Basel Treaty "an historic event that represents a ma-
jor shift toward cleaner production, capacity building in developing na-
tions and a desire to move away from the throw-away philosophy that is
all too common. 3 5 However, not all commentators shared such praise
for the Protocol. Tom Wolfe, an attorney with the Washington, D.C.-
based Capital Environmental, called the Liability Protocol "all politics,
really not legal [work] or negotiating," which was advanced merely be-
cause it "looks good for the U.N. program., 36 Kevin Stairs, a political
advisor with Greenpeace International, further derided the Protocol as
"the sad result of 10 years of effort by the industrial lobby to reduce the
original intention to a text with as many holes and exclusions as Swiss
cheese.
37
A. No Generator Liability
The Protocol, by placing exclusive responsibility on the "person in
operational control" to mitigate damages caused by hazardous wastes,
can exempt the generators of the waste from any liability.38 Arguably,
31. See id. art. 8, 11(a).
32. See id. art. 8, 1(b).
33. See id. art. 9.
34. BAN Report, supra note 5.
35. Basel Convention Approves Final Pact, but Some Question Fate of Agreement,
AsBEsTos & LEAD ABATEMENT REP., Dec. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL
10391434.
36. Id. (alteration in original).
37. Pruzin, supra note 26.
38. See Liability Protocol, supra note 7, art. 6, 1 ("[s]ubject to any requirement of do-
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this creates an incentive for generators to export their waste, contrary to
the original purpose of the Basel Convention.39 By passing waste on to a
"notifier" or exporter, a generator can escape all liability. Critics argue
that these notifiers may lack sufficient financial resources to effectively
deal with potential accidents. 
40
In addition, the ability to escape generator liability through the
Basel Convention may tempt US corporations to export their waste,
avoiding liability under the US "Superfund" legislation. 41 Roger Kluck, a
legal advisor to the Basel Action Network (BAN), specifically criticizes
this part of the Protocol:
[u]nder superfund provisions, a waste generator in the United States
who disposes his waste in a landfill which is not run properly is
jointly liable for any damage. So a generator is always on the hook,
which encourages a firm to ensure that the waste is being handled
correctly. All this is being undercut by the option to terminate liabil-
ity under the protocol, which acts as a significant and real incentive
to export.
42
Again, this potentially undermines the original purposes of the
Basel Convention.
B. No Superfund
Of particular concern to many developing countries, the Liability
Protocol failed to establish any sort of "Superfund" to aid clean-up in
economically disadvantaged locales.43 Developed countries prevailed in
mestic law any person in operational control of hazardous wastes and other wastes
at the time of an incident shall take all reasonable measures to mitigate damage
arising therefrom").
39. See BAN Report, supra note 5. The preamble to the original Basel Convention rec-
ognized the issue: "[n]oting that States should ensure that the generator should
carry out duties with regards to the transport and disposal of hazardous wastes and
other wastes in a manner that is consistent with the protection of the environment,
whatever the place of disposal.... Aware also of the growing international concern
about the need for stringent control of transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes and other wastes, and of the need as far as possible to reduce such move-
ment to a minimum." Basel Convention, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
40. See BAN Report, supra note 5; Pruzin, supra note 26. The Protocol does provide for
liability to be placed on any party who contributes to the accident. See supra text
accompanying note 24.
41. See Pruzin, supra note 26. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act ("Superfund") can be found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
42. See Pruzin, supra note 26.
43. See id.
[YB
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including only a very weak and effectively non-existent financial mecha-
nism, which was finalized in Article 15 of the Protocol: "[w]here com-
pensation under the Protocol does not cover the costs of damage, addi-
tional and supplementary measures aimed at ensuring adequate and
prompt compensation may be taken using existing mechanisms."" The
Protocol's drafters attempted to placate developing countries' concerns
by making an ambiguous and unenforceable promise: "[t]he Meeting of
the Parties shall keep under review the need for and possibility of im-
proving existing mechanisms or establishing a new mechanism., 45 This
was an arguably inadequate response to concerns raised by UNEP prior
to the December meeting, namely that the lack of funds for managing
wastes in developing countries whose "capabilities and capacities... in
disposal, monitoring and enforcement are quite weak" was in fact a seri-
ous problem.46
C. "Other" Agreement Exemptions
Perhaps the most significant criticism of the Protocol involves the
exemptions allowed under Article 3, Paragraph 7. That provision pro-
vides, in part: "[tihe Protocol shall not apply to damage due to an inci-
dent occurring during a transboundary movement of hazardous wastes
and other wastes and their disposal pursuant to a bilateral, multilateral or
regional agreement or arrangement concluded and notified in accordance
with Article 11 of the Convention."47 This provision is crucial as most
developed countries already have agreements for the transfer of hazard-
ous wastes (i.e., the OECD's "red-amber-green" waste shipment ac-
48cord). Roger Kluck of BAN also harshly criticizes this provision. "The
vast majority of hazardous waste shipments now taking place occur
44. Liability Protocol, supra note 7, art. 15, 1. This provision is made even weaker
when considered in conjunction with Article 3, Paragraph 7, which allows parties
to "opt out" of the Protocol through outside agreements. See id. art. 3, 7.
45. Id. art. 15, 2.
46. Gustavo Capdevila, Environment: Rich Nations Block Hazardous Waste Disposal
Fund, Inter Press Serv., Sept. 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5950416.
47. Liability Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3, 7. For the exemption to apply to an Article
11 agreement, the following four conditions must be met: 1) the damage occurred
in an area under the jurisdiction of a party to the agreement; 2) the agreement con-
tains a liability and compensation regime which meets the objectives of the Proto-
col; 3) the parties to the agreement notified the Depository of the non-application
of the Protocol; and 4) the parties have not declared that the Protocol shall be ap-
plicable. Article 11 provides that the Protocol will not replace other agreements
that were opened for signature at the time the Protocol was opened for signature,
even if such agreement is later amended. See id. art. 11.
48. See Pruzin, supra note 26.
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within the OECD, so most waste shipments won't be covered under the
protocol .... Developing countries don't want this [exemption]; they
want the protocol to act as a minimum global norm."
4 9
Of course, not all commentators agree with Kuck's assessment.
Philippe Roch, president of the Basel Meeting of the Parties,50 argues
that the Protocol is not designed to deal with developed countries. "It is
clear that OECD countries do not need this protocol because they already
have their own system."51 However, it is believed that OECD countries
account for approximately ninety-eight percent of the world's hazardous
waste, much of which ends up in developing countries.
52
D. Minimum Penalties
Annex B of the Liability Protocol provides for minimum penalties
in Annex B to the Protocol.53 However, these minimum penalties are
criticized by environmental groups as insufficient to cover potential
damages caused by hazardous wastes.54 Once again, observers disagreed
on this issue. Daniel Fantozzi, the US State Department's Office of Envi-
ronmental Policy Director, expressed concern that the minimum penal-
ties would have significant impacts on the trade of non-dangerous recy-
clable wastes.55 Fantozzi noted that recyclable wastes "can be in bulk
shipments with very low hazardous components, but because of those
components they would be caught by the agreement."56 Absent some
change in the liability provisions to account for his concern, Fantozzi de-
clared, "it would be a very serious question whether we would ratify. 57
CONCLUSION
As currently written, the Liability Protocol contains significant
loopholes that might reduce its effectiveness. Whether hazardous waste
producers take advantage of straw "notifiers" and exporters to shield
49. Id. (alteration in original).
50. Roch is also the head of the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, Forests, and
Landscape. See id.
51. Id.
52. See Tan, supra note 15.
53. See Liability Protocol, supra note 7, Annex B.
54. See BAN Report, supra note 5.
55. See Pruzin, supra note 26.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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them from liability, and whether any substantial compensation fund will
be created, remains to be seen. Hopefully, the Protocol will serve its pur-
pose and seven years of work and compromises will not be wasted.
Jerrold A. Long
